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MICKEY V. MICKEY: THE LONG-AWAITED CLARIFICATION IN THE 
LANDSCAPE OF EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF MARITAL ASSETS 
JENNIFER F. DALENTA 
Although the equitable distribution of assets during a marital 
dissolution proceeding is governed by Connecticut General Statutes 
section 46b-81, the interpretation of this statutory language has resulted in 
somewhat inconsistent case law, culminating in the Supreme Court of 
Connecticut’s recent decision in Mickey v. Mickey.  This Comment traces 
the judicial history of equitable distribution in Connecticut by reviewing 
several cases preceding the Mickey decision.  These cases have 
constructed a two-part test to determine whether property is equitably 
distributable.  The asset must be either (1) a presently existing and 
enforceable right or (2) a contingent interest that is not too speculative.  
Next, this Comment discusses the manners in which other jurisdictions 
have equitably distributed marital assets.  This Comment then analyzes the 
Mickey majority and dissenting opinions.  While the dissenting opinion 
characterizes the party’s interest as presently existing, the majority 
opinion describes it as an inchoate property interest that is too speculative 
to be equitably distributed.  The Mickey decision is somewhat 
controversial because it is factually analogous to a preceding case, yet 
asserts a contradictory holding to it.  Finally, this Comment concludes by 
considering where Connecticut jurisprudence stands today in regard to the 
equitable distribution of marital assets in light of the Court’s holding in 
Mickey.         
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MICKEY V. MICKEY: THE LONG-AWAITED CLARIFICATION IN THE 
LANDSCAPE OF EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF MARITAL ASSETS 
JENNIFER F. DALENTA* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
All newlywed couples dream of the white picket fence and the 
“happily ever after.”  Caught up in the moment, it can be difficult to truly 
understand how much is at stake when one commits to marriage and with it 
the intertwinement of assets.  Standing on the brink of a joint future, a 
couple looks ahead with hopes of building a comfortable lifestyle and a 
happy family.  Over the years, as they work toward these goals, the couple 
intermingles their funds and makes major purchases together, such as a 
house, its furnishings, and cars.  They conduct themselves like a typical 
married couple, sharing in the benefits and the burdens of joining their 
lives.  As the years pass, however, the couple is unable to withstand the 
pressures of marriage.  The burdens become too cumbersome for the 
couple to bear and the “happily ever after” begins to drift out of reach.  
Although the couple once functioned as a cohesive unit, their relationship 
begins to break down irretrievably.  Arguments become more frequent 
over everything from the maintenance of the household and the attendant 
expenses to proper parenting styles.   
Despite repeated efforts at salvaging their relationship, the couple 
ultimately decides to begin marital dissolution proceedings.  Now the 
question becomes: how can the couple untangle all of the assets that have 
been tangled between them, giving each individual what is rightly his or 
hers?  The issues seem endless.  Who gets the house?  How should the 
court address his pension?  What about alimony?  Child support?  Who 
will carry the health and dental insurance for the couple and their children?  
Who will pay the car loans?  Who will pay the credit card bills?  While the 
extent and complexity of the intertwinement of assets varies on a case by 
case basis, the general dilemma remains the same: what does a couple do 
when their relationship falls apart?    
In Connecticut, the law that governs these family matters is very much 
in flux.  This case law is particularly important because it defines what 
assets are at stake and how to equitably distribute them.  In the last year 
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alone, the Connecticut Appellate and Supreme Courts have made some 
potentially precedential decisions regarding family law.1  Whether these 
cases serve as clarification of the current law or a complete overhaul of the 
system remains to be seen.  Mickey v. Mickey2 is the quintessential 
example of the unclear effect of currently decided case law.  On one hand, 
the case can be interpreted as nothing more than judicial manipulation, 
resulting in the return to a prior legal framework.  On the other hand, it can 
be interpreted as the court’s attempt at redefining one aspect of the family 
law regime in order to create a more functional and readily applicable set 
of laws.3  The ultimate purpose of these recent cases, whether to serve as a 
regression or progression, will not be understood until future cases frame 
them.  It is this case law that this Comment explores.  
On July 21, 2009, the Connecticut Supreme Court ultimately held, in a 
3–2 decision, that disability benefits acquired as a result of a disability 
incurred after a marriage had been dissolved did not constitute distributable 
marital property under section 46b-81 of the Connecticut General Statutes.  
This statute dictates that the court may assign property to either party at the 
time of marital dissolution.4  In Mickey v. Mickey—the case before the 
court that July day—the marriage of the parties was dissolved on 
September 21, 2001, after a trial.  The trial court entered judgment 
dissolving the parties’ marriage and awarded the plaintiff wife forty 
percent of the defendant husband’s retirement benefits under chapter 66 of 
the Connecticut General Statutes.5  At the time of judgment, the defendant 
was employed as a corrections officer for the State of Connecticut at the 
Walker facility in Suffield, and was enrolled in the State Employees’ 
Retirement System (“SERS”) Tier II plan, pursuant to Connecticut law,6 
which entitled the defendant to receive certain retirement benefits upon 
reaching the age of sixty-five.7  As a corrections officer, the defendant was 
also receiving hazardous duty credited service pursuant to Connecticut 
law.8  At the time of the original dissolution trial, he had accumulated only 
                                                                                                                          
1 See, e.g., Maturo v. Maturo, 995 A.2d 1, 10 (Conn. 2010) (asserting that the child support 
guidelines must still be followed even where the parties’ combined income exceeds the threshold 
margin recognizing the opportunity for deviations and outside considerations); Crews v. Crews, 989 
A.2d 1060, 1070 (Conn. 2010) (articulating a high threshold standard for invalidating pre-nuptial 
agreements). 
2 Mickey v. Mickey, 974 A.2d 641 (Conn. 2009). 
3 See infra Parts IV–V (discussing the debate about the interpretations of the Mickey decision). 
4 Mickey, 974 A.2d at 645 & n.2. 
5 Id. at 646. 
6 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 5-192e–x (West 2009). 
7 Under the normal Tier II plan, a member  
who has attained the age sixty-five and has completed ten or more years of vesting 
service may retire on his own application on the first day of any future month named 
in the application.  Benefits shall be payable from that date provided the member is 
no longer in state employment.   
 Id. § 5-192l(a).   
8 Id. §§ 5-173, 5-192n.    
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fourteen years of credited service, which did not qualify him for hazardous 
duty retirement.  The defendant, however, did have a vested interest in the 
SERS Tier II pension.     
Shortly after the dissolution of marriage was finalized, the defendant 
was injured on the job.  He intervened in a fight between two inmates in 
the segregation unit and sustained injuries to his neck, right shoulder, and 
lower back.  These injuries caused the defendant to miss about seven 
weeks of work before they forced him into retirement.  Pursuant to his 
employment with the state, he was enrolled in the SERS, making him 
eligible for both normal retirement benefits and disability retirement 
benefits.9  As a result of his debilitating injury, his monthly retirement 
benefit payment increased substantially from $990.00 per month to 
approximately $2,300.00 per month, and the plaintiff continued to receive 
forty percent of the entire benefit received by the defendant, including the 
portion attributable to the post-judgment disability, retroactive to the date 
of retirement.10   
On January 13, 2006, the defendant filed a motion for clarification 
with the trial court on two grounds: (1) that the decision, though silent on 
the matter, did not intend for the plaintiff to be entitled to a portion of the 
defendant’s disability retirement pension since the court specifically noted 
its intentions to provide the plaintiff with a share of the defendant’s Tier II 
pension or his hazardous duty retirement; and (2) that regardless of 
whether the decision intended the plaintiff to be entitled to such funds, the 
court was without statutory authority to assign a portion of the defendant’s 
disability retirement pension where it was an asset acquired subsequent to 
the dissolution.11  The defendant’s motion for clarification was denied.  
The trial court also determined that the court had the right to distribute the 
defendant’s disability benefits, and that he therefore was not entitled to any 
relief.12  The defendant subsequently appealed the case to the appellate 
court.  He then filed a motion to transfer the case to the Connecticut 
Supreme Court, which was granted.  The supreme court reversed the trial 
court’s holding and ordered that the plaintiff was only entitled to the 
defendant’s benefits as they were at the time of the dissolution of 
marriage.13  This decision placed Mickey at the forefront of equitable 
distribution law in Connecticut.14   
                                                                                                                          
9 Id.    
10 The benefit also immediately vested at the time of disability, rather than being collectible at the 
time of the defendant’s retirement.  Mickey, 974 A.2d at 646. 
11 Id. at 645. 
12 Id. at 647. 
13 Id. at 664. 
14 In response, the plaintiff filed for reconsideration en banc, which was denied.  This denial 
suggested that Mickey would remain good, and relevant, law, as the court decided that there was clearly 
no need to rehear arguments on the issue with a second opportunity for review. 
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This Comment proceeds in five Parts.  Part II addresses the extent of 
the court’s jurisdiction to equitably distribute marital assets through a 
broad statutory mandate and traces the judicial history of equitable 
distribution in Connecticut by reviewing several cases preceding Mickey.  
Part III discusses the manners in which other jurisdictions have equitably 
distributed marital assets.  Part IV analyzes the Mickey majority decision 
and the dissenting opinion.  Part V addresses the future implications of the 
Mickey decision and whether it serves to overrule the court’s preceding 
decisions on the matter.  Finally, Part VI concludes by addressing the issue 
of where Connecticut jurisprudence stands today in regard to the equitable 
distribution of marital assets in light of the court’s somewhat controversial 
and ambiguous holding in Mickey.         
II.  THE COURT’S JURISDICTION TO EQUITABLY DISTRIBUTE MARITAL 
ASSETS AND THE JUDICIAL HISTORY OF EQUITABLE  
DISTRIBUTION IN CONNECTICUT  
The Supreme Court of Connecticut noted in Smith v. Smith that “it  
is . . . well settled that ‘[c]ourts have no inherent power to transfer property 
from one spouse to another; instead, that power must rest upon an enabling 
statute.’”15  As such, in the context of a dissolution of marriage action, the 
courts derive their authority to determine what constitutes property that is 
subject to equitable distribution from section 46b-81 of the Connecticut 
General Statutes.  The relevant language of the statute is as follows:   
At the time of entering a decree annulling or dissolving a 
marriage or for legal separation pursuant to a complaint 
under section 46b-45, the superior court may assign to either 
the husband or wife all or any part of the estate of the other.  
The court may pass title to real property to either party or to a 
third person or may order the sale of such real property, 
without any act by either the husband or the wife, when in 
the judgment of the court it is the proper mode to carry the 
decree into effect.16 
The Connecticut Supreme Court has held that this statutory grant of 
jurisdiction extends to property “possessed during [the parties’] 
marriage.”17  In this respect, the overarching belief that governs the 
equitable distribution of marital assets is that marriage constitutes more 
than simply a romantic relationship, but can also be considered an 
                                                                                                                          
15 Smith v. Smith, 752 A.2d 1023, 1029 (Conn. 1999) (quoting Passamano v. Passamano, 634 
A.2d 891, 893 n.4 (Conn. 1993)). 
16 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-81(a) (West 2009). 
17 Smith, 752 A.2d at 1030. 
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economic partnership.18     
Over the past two decades, the Connecticut judicial system has 
struggled with locating a bright line that differentiates between divisible 
and non-divisible assets in an effort to unscramble the ownership of 
property during a dissolution of marriage proceeding designed to give each 
spouse what is equitably his or hers.   
The Connecticut Supreme Court began its effort to narrow and 
interpret the statutory language by determining what did not constitute 
marital property subject to equitable distribution in Rubin v. Rubin.19  In 
that case, the plaintiff was the residuary beneficiary of a revocable inter 
vivos trust created by his mother.20  At the time of the marital dissolution 
action, the trust had not yet vested.    
The court declined to adopt the position that a contingent award of 
expected property could be upheld as a property transfer sanctioned under 
section 46b-81.21  It concluded that the equitable distribution of marital 
assets did not encompass contingent transfers of expected property and that 
it would not extend the statutory language in this way.22  The court noted 
that it was the legislature’s responsibility to amend the statute accordingly 
if it desired the statute to encompass such scenarios.23  In this respect, the 
court stated that “[t]o uphold the award of a share of an expectancy as 
contingent alimony might fairly be viewed as sanctioning in a different 
guise an assignment of property not then within the jurisdiction of the 
court, which we have concluded § 46b-81 does not authorize.”24  In sum, 
the court concluded that it was outside the scope of the statute’s control to 
divide property that the parties did not possess during their marriage, but 
that they obtained after the dissolution was finalized.25         
Less than a decade later, the Connecticut Supreme Court was again 
faced with the issue of how to equitably distribute the parties’ marital 
assets.  In Krafick v. Krafick, the court had to determine whether vested 
pension benefits constituted property for the purpose of equitable 
distribution.26  In that case, the couple had been married for over thirty 
years and had seven children.27  The plaintiff wife was a homemaker for 
the majority of the marriage, eventually returning to work part-time in a 
                                                                                                                          
18 Grace Ganz Blumberg, Marital Property Treatment of Pensions, Disability Pay, Workers’ 
Compensation, and Other Wage Substitutions: An Insurance, or Replacement, Analysis, 33 UCLA L. 
REV. 1250, 1251 (1986). 
19 527 A.2d 1184 (Conn. 1987). 
20 Id. at 1186. 
21 Id. at 1187. 
22 Id. at 1188. 
23 Id.  
24 Id. at 1190. 
25 Id. at 1187–88. 
26 Krafick v. Krafick, 663 A.2d 365, 366 (Conn. 1995). 
27 Id.   
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bakery.28  The defendant worked as a teacher, but retired after thirty-four 
years of service, shortly after the parties’ marriage was dissolved.29  As a 
result, the defendant’s pension did not vest until after the parties’ 
dissolution of marriage was finalized.     
Since the word “property” was not defined in the relevant legislation, 
the court began its analysis in Krafick by defining it, utilizing the common 
understanding of the term.  Relying on Black’s Law Dictionary’s very 
broad definition of property, which encompassed everything that is the 
subject of ownership, corporeal or incorporeal, tangible or intangible, 
visible or invisible, real or personal, the court concluded that “[n]othing in 
the legislative history of § 46b-81 indicates an intent to narrow the plain 
meaning of ‘property’ from its ordinarily broad and comprehensive scope.  
Indeed, the term ‘property’ has been broadly defined elsewhere in the 
General Statutes.”30  The court reasoned that the un-matured pension 
benefits were also considered property because they represented an 
enforceable contractual right.31  Although it was contingent on future 
events, the court held that it constituted more than a mere expectancy 
because there was a strong likelihood that the pension would vest.32     
After establishing that pension benefits were equitably distributable 
property under section 46b-81, the court turned to a public policy argument 
to support this finding.  It reasoned that since pension benefits were widely 
recognized as one of the most valuable assets that parties develop over the 
course of their marriage, it would be unfair and contrary to the purpose of 
the statute to strip the non-employee spouse of the value of the retirement 
asset by precluding the court from evaluating its worth prior to 
adjudicating the property rights of the parties.33  Based on its finding of a 
broad definition of property, as well as its strong policy convictions, the 
court concluded that the term “property,” as used in section 46b-81, 
included a right, which is “contractual in nature, to receive vested pension 
benefits in the future.”34  The court found that the trial court had abused its 
discretion by refusing to assign an appropriate valuation to the pension 
benefits, and by treating the pension as a mere expectancy rather than 
equitably distributable property; the court remanded the case to the trial 
court to make such an assignment.35                             
The law of equitable distribution of contingent property during a 
                                                                                                                          
28 Id.  
29 Id. at 367. 
30 Id. at 371; see also CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-278a (West 2009) (defining property for 
purposes of attachment as “any present or future interest in real or personal property, goods, chattels or 
choses in action, whether such is vested or contingent”). 
31 Krafick, 663 A.2d at 372. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 371–72. 
34 Id. at. 372–73. 
35 Id. at 376.   
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dissolution of marriage proceeding continued to develop in the following 
years.  In Simmons v. Simmons, the Supreme Court of Connecticut had to 
decide if something as intangible and invaluable as a medical degree 
constituted property that could be equitably distributed as a marital asset.36  
In this case, the critical problem was that the couple had few economic 
assets.37  As such, “[t]he degree, with its potential for increased earning 
power, [was], therefore, the only thing of real economic value to the 
parties.”38  The defendant relied on the court’s expansive interpretation of 
property in Krafick to argue that an advanced degree obtained during the 
marriage constituted property.39  The plaintiff, however, argued that a 
medical degree could not be distributed as property because it had “no 
inherent value independent of the holder and [did] not fit within the 
statutory definition of property.”40  The court reasoned that, while it did not 
retreat from the definition of property espoused in Krafick, the term 
certainly had limits.41           
The court stated that whether an interest could be considered equitably 
distributable property under section 46b-81 depended on whether it was 
presently existing or a mere expectancy, as section 46b-81 did not apply to 
mere expectancies.42  The court analogized the medical degree to the 
interest in an anticipated inheritance, which is not considered property 
under section 46b-81.43  Conversely, the court distinguished the medical 
degree from interests like vested pension benefits, which seem like 
expectancies because they are deferred compensation, yet are still presently 
existing, enforceable contract rights that represent more than a mere 
expectancy despite the fact that they are contingent on future events.44  The 
court went on to note that “[t]he enforceable rights inherent in a vested 
pension make it distinctly different from the expectation of possible 
benefits afforded by an advanced degree.”45  In this respect, the medical 
degree did not entail a presently existing, enforceable right.  Thus, the 
possibility of future earnings did not constitute a presently existing right, 
but a mere expectancy, and therefore, could not be subject to equitable 
distribution.    
By the late 1990s, the court had begun to carve out a digestible 
paradigm for understanding what types of property were subject to 
equitable distribution during a dissolution of marriage action.  The 
                                                                                                                          
36 Simmons v. Simmons, 708 A.2d 949, 951 (Conn. 1998). 
37 Id. at 952. 
38 Id.  
39 Id. at 953–54. 
40 Id. at 953. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 953–54. 
43 Id. at 954. 
44 Id.  
45 Id. at 954–55. 
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property landscape, however, was further complicated by the Supreme 
Court of Connecticut’s analysis in Bornemann v. Bornemann.46  In that 
case, the defendant husband was employed full-time and had extensive 
employment experience in management and lobbying, while the plaintiff 
wife was primarily a homemaker, taking care of the parties’ special needs 
child.47  Not only did the defendant make a substantial salary, but he also 
received stock options through his employer.48  The defendant appealed the 
dissolution judgment, claiming that the trial court erred in distributing the 
unvested fourth and fifth flights of his stock options.49   
After reviewing its recent rationales and decisions in Simmons and 
Krafick, the court analogized the stock options to the unvested pension 
benefits, finding that the defendant’s interest in the options amounted to 
more than a mere expectancy.50  The defendant entered into a termination 
agreement with his employer that gave him the right to remain classified as 
an employee for a certain period of time so as to allow him to exercise the 
fourth and fifth flights of his stock options, which remained unvested at the 
time of the agreement.51  The defendant did not have to engage in any 
affirmative acts in order to retain the options, but only had to refrain from 
certain actions for a specific period of time.52  Although the fourth and fifth 
flights were not presently exercisable at the time of the dissolution, and 
certain circumstances could have resulted in their forfeiture, the court held 
that the stock options still constituted more than a mere expectancy 
because maintaining them only required passive activity.53  It reasoned that 
under the circumstances, “the restrictions qualitatively were more closely 
analogous to other contingencies typically associated with deferred 
benefits,” like pensions.54  The court also relied on the trend in other 
jurisdictions, which had been to treat unvested stock options as property on 
the grounds that they produced a contractual right, a valuable form of 
intangible property.55  In support of this reliance, the court noted that 
should the employer attempt to withdraw his offer, the employee would 
have a potential action in contract against him.56   
Rather than determining ownership based on when the options actually 
vested, the court apportioned the unvested stock options according to when 
they were earned, ensuring that the plaintiff was entitled to fair, but not 
                                                                                                                          
46 752 A.2d 978 (Conn. 1998).   
47 Id. at 982. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 983–84. 
50 Id. at 984–86. 
51 Id. at 985. 
52 Id. at 991.   
53 Id. 
54 Id.  
55 Id. at 986. 
56 Id. at 985. 
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overreaching compensation.57  Further, the court considered the purpose of 
the options, and whether it was to compensate the employee for past or 
present services, or to create an incentive for future services.58  In this case, 
the unvested stock options were part of the defendant’s compensation for 
services rendered in the past, and therefore, constituted marital property 
that was subject to division because, as previously noted, they served as 
deferred compensation which, if acquired contemporaneously with his 
normal compensation, would have contributed to the marital household.59   
This decision further developed the concept of property as defined 
under section 46b-81, and required the court to explore and dissect the 
ambiguous area between mere expectancies and presently existing 
interests.60  The new rule that seemed to emerge from Bornemann was that 
any property which established a contractual right, including unvested 
stock options, could not be considered a mere expectancy, and therefore, 
could be considered an interest that was sufficient to constitute property 
under Connecticut’s equitable distribution statute. 
The supreme court’s next case on the issue of equitable distribution 
was quite complicated.  In Lopiano v. Lopiano, the plaintiff husband had 
served in Vietnam and then founded his own company, which the parties 
later sold.61  Over the next several years, the plaintiff battled addictions to 
cocaine and alcohol, had an affair with another woman, and was diagnosed 
with post traumatic stress disorder.62  After being arrested and receiving in-
patient care for his mental illness and addiction, he returned to the 
workforce as a construction worker in New York.63  The defendant 
supported the plaintiff throughout his struggles, reconciling with him on at 
least one occasion, and helping to keep the business operating when the 
defendant was incapable of doing so on his own.64   
After the plaintiff returned to work, he had an accident and sustained 
severe physical injuries, which resulted in his complete physical 
disability.65  The plaintiff then pursued a negligence action, which he won, 
leaving him with an award of $800,000.66  The defendant continued to be 
supportive after the accident by assisting the plaintiff with his relocation to 
a hospital near her, visiting and caring for him on a daily basis.67  The trial 
court found that the defendant was in good health and making a decent 
                                                                                                                          
57 Id. at 989. 
58 Id. at 987–88. 
59 Id. at 991. 
60 Id. at 984–85. 
61 Lopiano v. Lopiano, 752 A.2d 1000, 1005 (Conn. 1998). 
62 Id.  
63 Id.  
64 Id. at 1005–06. 
65 Id. at 1005. 
66 Id.  
67 Id.  
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living as a medical office secretary, and the plaintiff survived comfortably 
off of Social Security disability, veteran’s disability benefits, and worker’s 
compensation benefits.68  
The plaintiff claimed that the trial court erred in including the portion 
of his personal injury award received as compensation for pain and 
suffering and the portion that served as compensation for post-dissolution 
lost wages as property subject to distribution under section 46b-81.69  The 
plaintiff, however, also recognized that the judgment in his personal injury 
case clearly amounted to a presently existing property interest in a specific 
award that fell within the realm of section 46b-81.70  The court noted that 
there were three different approaches among the various jurisdictions that 
it could follow when determining how to divide personal injury judgments 
for the purposes of distribution in a marital dissolution proceeding.71  
The first was to “classify any such award or settlement as the personal 
and entirely separate property of the injured spouse.”72  The second 
approach required the assessment of the purpose of the compensation in 
order to determine whether the property was “marital” or “personal.”73  
The third approach, and the more modern trend, asserted that any award 
acquired during the marriage should be deemed marital property regardless 
of its underlying purpose.74  None of these approaches, however, directly 
mirrored the way that Connecticut approached such dilemmas.   
Instead, the court recognized that “[r]ather than narrow the plain 
meaning of the term ‘property’ from its ordinarily comprehensive scope, in 
enacting § 46b-81, ‘the legislature acted to expand the range of resources 
subject to the trial court’s power of division, and did not intend that 
property should be given a narrow construction.’”75  It defined property, 
for purposes of section 46b-81 as:  
[T]he term commonly used to denote everything which is the 
subject of ownership, corporeal or incorporeal, tangible or 
intangible, visible or invisible, real or personal; everything 
that has an exchangeable value or which goes to make up 
wealth or estate.  It extends to every species of valuable right 
and interest, and includes real and personal property, 
easements, franchises, and incorporeal hereditaments.76    
Simply because the property belonged to one of the parties did not 
                                                                                                                          
68 Id. at 1006. 
69 Id.  
70 Id. at 1009. 
71 Id. 
72 Id.  
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 1010. 
75 Id. at 1008 (quoting Bornemann v. Bornemann, 752 A.2d 978, 984 (1998)). 
76 Id. at 1007–08 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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guarantee that he or she would be the ultimate owner, as the legislature 
gave the court broad discretion in arriving at an equitable distribution of 
the marital assets.77  In the end, the court found that it could subject the 
plaintiff’s personal injury compensation to equitable distribution because 
the injury for which the award was ultimately given occurred during the 
parties’ marriage, thereby placing it in the realm of distributable property.78  
In fact, in footnote five of the decision, the court recognized that the 
paramount question in determining whether an asset is distributable 
property is whether the interest is earned prior to or subsequent to the date 
of dissolution.79  The implication from this language is quite clear: assets 
earned prior to the dissolution, even those representing compensation for 
future services, constituted marital property, while assets earned after the 
date of dissolution did not.            
In his dissent, Justice McDonald raised an interesting point that was 
later used as support for the majority’s finding in Mickey.  He stated, “[i]t 
is difficult to conceive how compensation for pain and suffering and future 
lost wages can be considered fruits of the marriage, as they do not arise out 
of the marriage and are independent of it.”80  Justice Berdon, also 
dissenting, argued that following the court’s reasoning in Bornemann, 
unvested stock options constituted marital property because they were 
earned prior to the date of dissolution.  Further, he argued that the plaintiff 
in the instant case had not earned the portion of the award that pertained to 
his future pain and suffering, that he did not experience that anguish during 
the course of the marriage, and that the relevant damages were not 
intended to compensate him for his past agony.81   
In the end, however, the majority found that although the plaintiff may 
suffer from the repercussions of the injury after the marital dissolution was 
finalized, the plaintiff was injured while the marriage was still intact, 
thereby allowing for the personal injury compensation to be considered 
property subject to equitable distribution because it represented a then 
presently existing property interest of a determinable value.82          
The property distribution landscape was further complicated by the 
Connecticut Supreme Court’s holding in Smith v. Smith.  In that case, the 
parties held many different professional positions during their marriage.  
After reviewing the parties’ financial affidavits, the trial court concluded 
that the defendant had acquired all of her assets through her own efforts 
and investments with the exception of $275,000 that she received in the 
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settlement of a lawsuit against her employer.83  Basing its decision on the 
fact that the parties were only married for four out of the five years of the 
defendant’s employment from which the settlement claim arose, the trial 
court awarded the plaintiff $75,000 of the $275,000 total settlement 
received by the defendant.84   
In reviewing the trial court’s decision, the court reiterated the long 
standing notion that the purpose of property division pursuant to a 
dissolution proceeding was “to unscramble existing marital property” and 
provide equitable shares to each party.85  Further, “an attempt to divide 
expected property [was] outside the scope of the statutes because it [did] 
not divide the property that the parties possessed during their marriage.”86  
The court ultimately determined that the trial court reasonably found that 
the defendant’s claim against her employer was an inchoate marital asset at 
the point of equitable distribution; through the defendant’s work at the 
company, she had already earned an enforceable right to the compensation 
before the dissolution of marriage was finalized.  The court went on to 
explain in dicta that the fact that the plaintiff may not have helped in the 
acquisition of the settlement “[did] not vitiate the fact that the right to the 
asset had been earned mostly during the parties’ marriage,”87 thereby 
making it subject to equitable distribution upon dissolution.   
The court also addressed the issue of the trial court’s statutory 
authority to divide after-acquired assets, finding that the trial court lacked 
the requisite statutory authority to divide assets acquired after a marriage 
had formally ended through a dissolution proceeding.88  Another property 
dispute arose between the parties over a potential trust estate.  The trial 
court entered an order retaining continuing jurisdiction for several years 
after the entry of judgment over any interest the plaintiff could have in a 
family trust, for the express purpose of distributing the asset if and when it 
was received.89  The plaintiff appealed this decision, claiming that the trial 
court exceeded its jurisdiction in retaining jurisdiction over the family 
trust.90  Maintaining consistency with its ruling on the defendant’s 
employment settlement, the court reversed the decision of the trial court, 
reasoning that “the marital estate divisible pursuant to § 46b-81 refers to 
interests already acquired, not to expected or unvested interests, or to 
interests that the court has not yet quantified.”91     
                                                                                                                          
83 Smith v. Smith, 752 A.2d 1023, 1028 (Conn. 1999). 
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87 Id. at 1036. 
88 Id. at 1031. 
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Just a year later, the appellate court was faced with an issue that 
required it to apply the developing property distribution paradigm.  After 
eighteen years of marriage, the parties in Hopfer v. Hopfer filed for a 
dissolution of their marriage.92  The defendant worked at a subsidiary of 
Viacom and upon the company’s announcement that it would be selling 
this subsidiary, the defendant began to worry about the security of his 
position under the prospect of new management.93  The defendant’s 
employment with a new company as the chief information officer began 
approximately two months before the court rendered judgment in the 
parties’ dissolution of marriage action.94  The defendant received a base 
salary as well as shares of stock, which vested at a rate of twenty-five 
percent per year with an initial vesting date nearly a year after their 
dissolution of marriage was finalized.95        
The court began its analysis by distinguishing the Connecticut 
Supreme Court’s holding in Bornemann from the instant case.  The court 
noted that “in Bornemann, the stock options were found to be awarded for 
past services rendered.”96  Conversely, in the instant case, the court 
affirmed the trial court’s finding that the defendant’s unvested stock 
options were compensation for services, which would be rendered post-
judgment, and were therefore not marital property subject to distribution 
during the marital dissolution.97  The court concluded that it was not an 
error for the trial court to have excluded the options as marital property 
where they were an incentive for future services provided, not a reward for 
past services rendered.98   
As a result of this decision and its predecessors, the cases’ holdings 
slowly began to paint a comprehensible picture of the judicial landscape 
surrounding the equitable distribution of marital assets by clearly 
distinguishing between what did and did not constitute property under the 
applicable statute.   
The following year, however, Bender v. Bender quickly muddied the 
seemingly clear waters of equitable distribution jurisprudence.  In that 
case, the parties had been married for over twenty years and had four 
children together.99  At the time of the dissolution, the defendant had been 
employed as a firefighter for nineteen years.100  The defendant was entitled 
to a pension if he reached twenty-five years of service.101  Therefore, at the 
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time of the dissolution of marriage action, his benefits were unvested, 
except in regards to disability.  If the defendant were to leave service 
before the twenty-five years, and not as a result of a disability, he would 
receive only the contributions that he had made to the pension plan to 
date.102  The Supreme Court of Connecticut granted certiorari on the issue 
of whether unvested pension benefits could be considered property under 
section 46b-81, thereby subjecting them to equitable distribution during a 
marital dissolution proceeding.103     
The defendant claimed that the unvested pension benefits were not 
property under the applicable statute, while the plaintiff claimed that the 
defendant’s interest in the unvested pension benefits was not a mere 
expectancy, but rather, constituted a presently existing property interest, 
thereby allowing for its subjection to equitable distribution.104  The court 
first noted that equity must rely on substance rather than mere form, 
finding that since nineteen of the twenty-five years necessary for the 
vesting of the defendant’s pension benefits were years in which the parties 
were marital partners, that the unvested pension benefits still constituted 
marital property subject to equitable distribution under the statute.105  In 
analyzing the foregoing decisional law, the court identified the common 
theme in determining whether a certain interest was property subject to 
division: whether the party’s “expectation of a benefit attached to that 
interest was too speculative to constitute divisible marital property.”106  
The court articulated the following test:  
[I]n determining whether a certain interest is property subject 
to equitable distribution under § 46b-81, we look to whether 
a party’s expectation of a benefit attached to that interest was 
too speculative to constitute divisible marital property. . . . In 
cases in which an interest was so speculative as to constitute 
a mere expectancy, we concluded that it was not property 
subject to equitable distribution; . . . whereas, in cases in 
which an interest was not so speculative as to constitute a 
mere expectancy, but rather a presently existing interest in 
property, we treated it as property subject to equitable 
distribution.107         
Extrapolating from this test, the court held that the defendant’s 
unvested pension benefits were not too speculative to be considered 
property subject to equitable distribution under the statute, explaining: 
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Our conclusion that the defendant’s unvested pension 
benefits are not a mere expectancy is consistent with the 
nature of retirement benefits, and the fact that employers and 
employees treat retirement benefits as property in the 
workplace. . . . [P]ension benefits represent a form of 
deferred compensation for services rendered . . . .  Most 
retirement plans permit the employee to take a reduction in 
present salary in exchange for increased future retirement 
benefits . . . .  If retirement benefits were truly only [a mere 
expectancy], employers and employees would not treat them 
as a substitute for present wages.108    
Such a movement away from precedents through the creation of a less 
flexible test with defined parameters was presumably grounded in 
productive and positive intentions.  A potential rationale for such a test was 
to impose something of an immediate offset method, which would sever 
the parties’ economic ties and prevent further judicial oversight of the 
matter.  In the end, Bender’s legacy lived on through its establishment of a 
two-part test to determine equitably distributable property.  Either the 
property must be: (1) presently existing and legally enforceable property 
rights; or (2) contingent or unvested property that is not too speculative in 
nature.109   
In the dissent, Justice Zarella argued that the majority misconstrued 
both the statute and the applicable case law, which indicated that only 
those interests in which a party had a presently existing, enforceable right 
could be deemed property subject to equitable distribution under section 
46b-81.110  Further, he asserted that the case law demonstrated that if the 
interest was merely an expectancy, it could not be subject to equitable 
distribution, considering that there was a risk that the holder of the 
unvested or future benefits could never receive them.111  Justice Zarella 
continued in his dissent to acknowledge that such expectancies should not 
be ignored in calculating the equitable distribution of the marital assets, but 
could be accounted for when considering the parties’ ability to acquire 
income in the future.112  As such, Justice Zarella argued that when a 
pension benefit became vested and was in payment status, the trial court 
could treat it as a changed circumstance that would warrant the alteration 
of the alimony award.113  For him, the solution was not simply to change 
the legal framework to prevent continued judicial oversight, but to 
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maintain the bright line rule articulated in both the statute and the case law, 
a decision which could lead to future litigation down the road, but would 
operate harmoniously with precedent.  His staunch opposition to the 
court’s holding in this case would later serve as the catalyst to facilitate the 
Mickey majority decision, now the binding authority in Connecticut.      
After a six-year lull, the Appellate Court of Connecticut found itself 
addressing the same issue that had plagued the Supreme Court of 
Connecticut for over a decade, that of the equitable distribution of marital 
assets.  In Czarzasty v. Czarzasty, the parties had been married for nearly 
fifteen years.114  Throughout their marriage the wife had worked for Merrill 
Lynch in various positions while the husband initially worked as the 
president of a construction company.115  When the company dissolved, the 
wife helped her husband obtain a job at Merrill Lynch and the couple 
began to work together as an investment team, with the parties splitting 
their commissions seventy-thirty between the wife and husband, 
respectively.116  The couple remained an investment team until 2001.  At 
the time of the dissolution, both parties were still employed at Merrill 
Lynch.117  Merrill Lynch provided various financial plans for its 
employees, including the investment certificate plan, a performance-based 
deferred compensation award in the amount of $100,000, which was 
awarded after ten years of employment with Merrill Lynch as long as the 
employee met a specific production goal during that ten-year period.118  By 
the time of their marital dissolution, the wife had already received her 
certificate, and the defendant was projected to receive his award in two 
years, and was on target to meet his production goal.119   
The trial court somewhat simplistically determined that, “because the 
certificate was intended to procure ten years of employment,” and “because 
two years of that period would take place post-divorce,” the certificate had 
been eighty percent earned.120  In this respect, the court found that the 
husband’s interest in the certificate was marital property subject to 
distribution under section 46b-81.121  The husband subsequently appealed 
the court’s finding.122  
In reviewing the previous case law that had addressed this issue, the 
appellate court found that there was a nuanced and sometimes subtle 
difference between expected property, which was currently nonexistent 
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and could never exist, and a sufficiently concrete and reasonable 
probability that the property would vest.123  Under a modified version of 
the Bender test, the court stated that:  
If the likelihood [wa]s not too speculative, then it [wa]s 
property subject to valuation and distribution. . . .  [T]he trial 
court in this instance did not comment on whether the party 
had a presently existing contractual right to the future receipt 
of the asset in question.  Rather, the court made an 
assessment of the probability that the defendant would, in 
fact, receive the asset.124   
The appellate court deferred to the trial court’s finding that the certificate 
was property subject to equitable distribution because it was more than a 
mere expectancy, as there was a strong probability that it would vest within 
two years.125     
The final case that defined the equitable distribution regime in 
Connecticut prior to Mickey was decided ten weeks after Czarzasty.  In the 
summer of 2007, the appellate court rendered its decision in Ranfone v. 
Ranfone.126  In that case, the parties had been married for nearly twenty 
years and had one child.127  The trial court had divided the marital assets by 
ordering the defendant husband to pay alimony to the plaintiff wife while 
also sustaining a health insurance plan for her during the period of 
payment.128  Among other divisions, the court awarded the plaintiff fifty 
percent of the value of the defendant’s pension, “valued and payable to her 
as of the date that he first bec[ame] eligible to begin collecting his share of 
the pension. . . .”129  
The defendant appealed the trial court’s decision, arguing that the court 
did not err in dividing the pension benefits, but that it should have only 
included contributions made until the date of the marital dissolution; 
therefore, the court improperly awarded the plaintiff too much of the 
defendant’s pension benefits.130  The defendant further cited Bornemann in 
arguing that assets must be earned during the marriage to constitute marital 
property subject to equitable distribution during a dissolution 
proceeding.131  
Relying on the Connecticut Supreme Court’s previous holding in 
Bender, the appellate court upheld the trial court’s holding, stating that the 
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case law interpreting what could properly be considered marital property 
pursuant to section 46b-81 considered the “equitable purpose of [the] 
statutory distribution scheme, rather than . . . mechanically applied rules of 
property law.”132  Therefore, although there were undeniable differences 
between the situation in Bender and that in the instant case, as the Bender 
court would presumably have ruled in the opposite manner by only 
awarding the plaintiff the part of the pension that coincided with the 
marriage, the court analogized the cases and noted that the broad language 
of Bender allowed for judicial discretion in determining what constituted 
marital property.133  This decision opened the door for some major changes 
in the dissolution of marriage arena, and it would only take a matter of a 
few years for them to come to fruition.           
III.  OTHER JURISDICTIONS’ TREATMENT OF DISABILITY BENEFITS 
Most jurisdictions have attempted to create bright line rules to guide 
the equitable distribution of marital assets.134  Due to advanced technology 
and unanticipated types of property, however, maintaining a universally 
applicable standard has been nearly impossible.  The Rhode Island 
Supreme Court held in Thompson v. Thompson that since disability 
benefits serve as compensation for loss of future earning capacity, they 
should not constitute a marital asset subject to equitable distribution.135  In 
that case, the two parties filed for divorce after a long-term marriage.136  
Throughout their marriage, the plaintiff was a homemaker while the 
defendant worked as a firefighter until obtaining subsequent employment 
after a work-related disability.137  The trial court initially awarded the 
plaintiff sixty-five percent of the marital assets, including sixty-five 
percent of the defendant’s disability pension.138  The supreme court held 
that because disability benefits compensate a wage earner for lost earning 
capacity, the benefits do not constitute part of the marital estate.139  The 
court further held, however, that the lower courts may consider disability 
benefits as income for the purposes of determining alimony and child 
support awards.140  Academics have criticized the court’s holding in 
Thompson on the grounds that the determination of what constitutes 
property subject to equitable distribution during a marital dissolution 
action should be assessed on a case-by-case basis, rather than by creating 
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generally applicable rules.141  This case is analogous to the Supreme Court 
of Connecticut’s holding in Mickey.       
Another Rhode Island Supreme Court ruling a few years later further 
advanced the law of equitable distribution of marital assets.  In Giha v. 
Giha, the court held that lottery ticket winnings that arose during the 
interlocutory period of a divorce were subject to equitable distribution as a 
marital asset.142  Since the final dissolution decree had not been officially 
ordered, the court held that the parties were still legally married and 
therefore obligated to disclose changes in financial circumstances.143  
Academics have applauded this decision because it “protects spouses from 
nondisclosure and ensures that lottery [winnings] occurring prior to  
the final divorce decree are marital assets subject to . . . equitable 
distribution. . . .”144  The holding created a bright-line rule that any assets 
obtained prior to the dissolution of marriage could be subject to equitable 
distribution, while those obtained after dissolution presumably were not.  
Mickey also seems to create something of a bright-line rule for the 
application of the statute through the court’s use of the “fruits of the 
marriage” language.145   
Only a few states away, the New York Court of Appeals was also 
faced with the issue of equitable distribution in DeLuca v. DeLuca.146  In 
that case, the parties had been married for over thirty years.147  The 
husband worked for the New York City Police Department (NYPD), 
advancing to the rank of Detective, First Grade, while the wife was a 
homemaker.148  Before the dissolution of marriage judgment was issued, 
the husband retired from the NYPD, after thirty-one years of service, and 
began receiving both his regular pension benefits and his Police Superior 
Officer’s Variable Supplement Fund (PSOVSF) benefits.149  The appellate 
division found that only the husband’s regular pension benefits were 
marital property subject to distribution.150  The New York courts had 
previously stated that, “[i]n the context of marital property, pensions have 
been described as ‘contract rights of value, received in lieu of higher 
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compensation, which would otherwise have enhanced either marital assets 
or the marital standard of living.’”151  In the instant case, however, the 
appellate division reasoned that the PSOVSF benefits were not the type 
that accrued over time nor were they received in lieu of higher 
compensation which would have enhanced the marital assets or standard of 
living.152  Instead, they were the type that became available only upon the 
occurrence of two conditions: (1) an officer had to be a member of the 
benefit fund, and (2) he or she had to retire after at least twenty years of 
service.153      
On appeal, the court of appeals reversed the appellate division’s 
decision, instead holding that a non-pension supplemental benefit received 
by a New York police officer was marital property subject to equitable 
distribution in a divorce settlement, notwithstanding the fact that the 
officer did not become eligible to receive the benefit until after the divorce 
action commenced.154  The court reasoned that in light of the broad 
conception of marital property, “vesting” was not a determinative factor.155  
Further, the court noted that, based on previous cases, compensation 
obtained after the marital dissolution for services rendered during the 
marriage was deemed marital property.156  Although this benefit was not 
related to a pension, it was awarded to the husband for past services 
rendered.  Therefore, rather than following the traditional rule that benefits 
are not divisible unless they have vested, the court adopted a new standard 
that if benefits could be interpreted as compensation for past services that 
were rendered during the marriage, at least a portion would be subject to 
equitable distribution regardless of the vesting date.  Interestingly, the 
court’s opinion in DeLuca, although not mandatory authority, operates 
harmoniously with the Connecticut Supreme Court’s decision in Mickey, as 
the defendant’s disability benefits were not compensation for past services 
rendered but rather functioned as payment for future lost wages resulting 
from his post-dissolution debilitating injury. 
IV.  ANALYZING THE MICKEY MAJORITY DECISION AND THE  
DISSENTING OPINION 
At the time that Mickey entered the judicial landscape, the statutory 
grant of jurisdiction under Connecticut General Statutes section 46b-81 
extended to property “possessed during [the] marriage”157 and to property 
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interests that were not “too speculative to constitute divisible marital 
property.”158  In other words, section 46b-81 applied to interests that were 
more than mere expectancies, but that were not necessarily currently 
vested entities.  The case law prior to Bender seemed to consistently 
establish the general rule that assets earned prior to the date of dissolution, 
even those representing compensation for future services, constituted 
marital property that was subject to distribution, while assets earned after 
the date of dissolution did not.159  Bender, however, quickly turned this 
easily applicable standard on its head, and seemed to create a second step 
for consideration based on the speculative nature of the contingent asset.160  
After the decision in Mickey, the looming question remained whether the 
“too speculative” rule that was memorialized in Bender was still good law.  
In the Mickey decision, the Connecticut Supreme Court appeared to revert 
to the same analytical framework that it had used in Lopiano and the other 
related cases prior to Bender.  In this respect, it was not surprising that the 
author of the majority opinion for Mickey, Justice Zarella, was also the 
author of the dissenting opinion in Bender.161  
The plaintiff in Mickey first relied on the court’s holding in a previous 
case, Travelers Insurance Co. v. Pondi-Salik,162 to assert that the 
defendant’s disability benefits were subject to equitable distribution in 
accordance with section 46b-81, thereby serving as a dispositive 
precedent.163  In response, the court articulated the integral differences 
between Pondi-Salik and the instant case.164  It noted that, although the 
disability retirement-benefit statute at issue was the same in both cases, the 
“significant factual and procedural differences between the two cases 
render[ed] Pondi-Salik inapposite.”165  Pondi-Salik lacked any discussion 
of the speculative nature of disability benefits or the characterization of 
such benefits prior to a disability.166  Therefore, Pondi-Salik was not 
dispositive and the court was able to assess the legitimacy of the 
defendant’s other claims before rendering a decision.167   
After describing the relevant statutes, the applicable terminology, and 
the overarching principles that guide equitable-distribution jurisprudence, 
the court turned to the defendant’s argument that his disability benefits 
were too speculative to be considered marital property subject to equitable 
distribution under section 46b-81.  The defendant asserted that the 
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disability benefits were not marital property because they were not 
acquired until after the dissolution of marriage, and because they 
functioned as compensation for lost wages, which were attributable to 
services that would be performed post-dissolution.168  The court began by 
assessing the judicial history, particularly in terms of its characterization of 
property.  It noted that the initial framework created a stark division 
between presently existing property and mere expectancies—the former as 
distributable and the latter as immune from statutory subjection.169   
After providing a brief overview of the factual background and 
procedural posture of Mickey’s predecessors, the court turned to its 
decision in Bender—which did not on its face seem to abide by the same 
scheme—stating that the decision “updated this traditional, fairly rigid 
dichotomy by establishing a more nuanced approach to defining property 
interests under § 46b-81.”170  Going further in its explanation of Bender, 
the court added:  
Consistent with our time-honored approach, we reiterated 
that presently enforceable rights, based on either property or 
contract principles, are sufficient to cause property to be 
divisible.  Where Bender broke new ground was in its 
recognition that such rights are not the “sine qua non of 
‘property’ under § 46b-81.”  In building on our prior cases, 
we expanded our notion of property under § 46b-81, 
recognizing that there is a spectrum of interests that do not fit 
comfortably into our traditional scheme and yet should be 
available in equity for courts to distribute.171   
Arguably, the court’s commentary could be interpreted as an excuse for its 
betrayal of the well-ingrained decisional framework for determining 
distributable property, as the court’s decision in Mickey arguably overruled 
rather than supplemented its decision in Bender.  As such, one could find 
that the court used this language to create a smokescreen of harmony 
between the arguably contradictory holdings, which hid Mickey’s 
underlying function of overruling Bender.  On the other hand, one could 
also argue that Mickey served to further develop the Bender test.  Part V 
will further analyze this debate.   
Regardless of outside interpretation, the court claimed to rely on the 
two-part test that was set forth in Bender, which preserved the traditional 
definition of property, while also “carving out a middle ground, 
encompassing some inchoate property interests that would have been 
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excluded from the definition of distributable property under the older 
regime.”172  This “inchoate property” referred to the consideration of 
contingent unmatured interests that were not too speculative in nature.173  
The court asserted that the addition of a second step provided a measure of 
flexibility that would prevent unfair results.174  To clarify, in Bender, the 
court found that although the defendant’s unvested pension benefits were 
contingent, they were “sufficiently certain to constitute divisible property” 
because they could be quantified.175  In its attempt to reconcile Bender and 
Mickey, the court went on to explain that Bender articulated the second 
step of the property test, whereby the speculative nature of the property 
interest had to be assessed in conjunction with other factors—like, for 
instance, in Bender, the fact that such benefits normally were treated as 
property because they constituted a trade-off for higher wages—to 
determine if the property was subject to distribution under section 46b-
81.176  
After the court explained its rationale for extending the definition of 
property beyond the statutory language to create an even broader 
interpretation, it applied the analysis to Mickey.  Justice Zarella quickly 
dismissed the possibility that the defendant’s disability benefits were 
property under the first step of the test, in which the interest must be a 
“presently existing, enforceable right,” noting that the defendant “had no 
concrete, enforceable right to those benefits unless and until” he was in a 
disabling accident.177  Further, Justice Zarella added that the legislature 
could have modified or terminated the defendant’s rights to the benefits at 
its discretion,178 thereby making his right to the benefits even more illusory 
and demonstrating that he had no enforceable right to anything until he 
suffered a disability.  This is dissimilar from previous cases where an 
enforceable contract right was created with a private employer.  As such, 
Justice Zarella concluded that to attempt to define the defendant’s right as 
“presently existing[] [and] enforceable” would be to “stretch the meaning 
of these words beyond the breaking point.”179  
Although the existence of a presently existing, legally enforceable 
right is sufficient to constitute equitably distributable property under 
section 46b-81, it is not necessary.180  Therefore, the court turned to the 
second step of the test and analyzed the nature of the contingency to 
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determine if it was sufficiently probable to constitute property.181  In 
assessing the existence of this step, the court stated: 
A potential disability is, by its very nature, an accidental 
event that every employee and employer strives to avoid.  It 
is difficult to perceive how a property interest tied to such an 
occurrence is “sufficiently concrete, reasonable and 
justifiable”; to treat any benefits that might accrue, if the 
accident eventually occurs and is serious enough to cause 
permanent disability, as a presently existing property interest 
eligible for equitable distribution at the time of dissolution.182     
The court compared the situation in the instant case to the precedents, 
finding that these disability benefits were more unpredictable and less 
certain than the income expected to result from the obtainment of a 
medical degree in Simmons, for instance.183 
In an unexpected turn, the Court seemed to unknowingly add another 
step to the two-step test.  Justice Zarella added that even if the disability 
benefits were sufficiently concrete to constitute distributable property, it 
would still not be classified as such due to the particular facts of the 
case.184  He then appeared to assert the newly created third step, stating: “A 
benefit derived from an injury occurring years after dissolution, meant 
solely to compensate for the loss of future wages, simply does not 
represent the ‘fruits’ of the marital partnership that § 46b-81 is designed to 
equitably parse.”185  This statement seems to suggest that the court created 
an additional step that must be satisfied to constitute marital property 
subject to distribution, a standard that will fittingly be referred to as the 
“fruits of the marriage” requirement.  This step arguably relies on two 
main considerations: (1) the temporal relationship between the property 
and the marriage, and (2) the ultimate purpose of the property.    
The court concluded its opinion by finding that the portion of the 
defendant’s retirement benefit attributable to his years of service was 
subject to equitable distribution.186  It found that such a decision conformed 
to the court’s holding in Bender that pension benefits served as deferred 
compensation earned during the marriage, which was reasonably 
quantifiable.187  On the other hand, the court found that the portion of the 
defendant’s benefit attributable to his disability was too speculative to 
constitute marital property and too unpredictable to be considered deferred 
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income, yet served as compensation for future lost wages.188  Ultimately, 
the court concluded that the plaintiff was entitled to forty percent of the 
defendant’s regular retirement benefits and none of his disability 
benefits.189   
The dissenters, Justices Norcott and Katz, argued that the decision 
should not have even proceeded beyond the first step of the Bender test 
because it was a presently existing and legally enforceable right.190  Citing 
the statutory language relevant to the defendant’s benefits, Connecticut 
General Statutes section 5-192p, the dissent argued that even though the 
actual retrieval of the benefits was contingent on him becoming disabled, 
he had a vested right to them from his first day of employment with the 
State of Connecticut, which the legislature could not simply revoke at its 
discretion.191  The dissenters drew the distinction in the application of the 
rule, stating that “presently existing and [legally] enforceable” did not also 
mean that the party had to have the right to immediate “receipt and 
enjoyment of the benefit, or even an unconditional guarantee that the 
benefit w[ould] be received at all.”192  Relying on Mickey’s precedents, the 
dissent noted that those holdings indicated that interests were not reduced 
to mere expectancies as long as the party had an enforceable right in the 
event that the contingent condition did occur.193  In the dissent’s 
interpretation of the judicial history, the likelihood of the occurrence of the 
condition was immaterial.194   
Further, striking down the majority’s emphasis on the time of retrieval, 
the dissent argued that “whether an asset is marital property turns on the 
time at which an enforceable right to the particular benefit was obtained, 
and not on whether the benefits associated with the interest were received 
during the marriage.”195  Therefore, the dissenters concluded that whether 
the benefits were received prior to the marital dissolution and whether they 
partially served as compensation for future lost wages were irrelevant 
considerations in their determination that the disability benefits were 
marital assets that should have been subject to equitable distribution.196  
The dissent’s opinion completely contradicts the majority decision in 
Bender and misinterprets the two-step test.  The Connecticut Supreme 
Court held that property had to be either (1) a presently existing and legally 
enforceable right (the traditional notion of property) or (2) an unvested 
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benefit that was not too speculative.197  Despite the fact that the plaintiff 
would receive compensation in the event of a debilitating work-related 
injury, he did not arguably have any present right to those benefits at the 
time of the divorce, and the dissent’s attempt to portray them as such is 
erroneous.  The disability benefits did not constitute property under the 
first step of the Bender test because the plaintiff lacked a presently existing 
and legally enforceable right to them.  This was a conditional right that was 
only triggered in the event of a debilitating injury.   
A better way to understand the plaintiff’s lack of a presently existing 
and legally enforceable right to the disability benefits is to alter the 
scenario.  If the plaintiff had never been injured, how would the parties 
have divided this unvested benefit?  It is unlikely that such a benefit could 
or should be monetized.  Therefore, although still somewhat unclear, 
disability benefits are better portrayed as unvested, conditional benefits.  
Since the court determined that the condition under which these benefits 
could be obtained was too speculative in nature, it refused to equitably 
divide them as part of the dissolution proceeding.198  To heed the dissent’s 
stance would overrule the very framework that the court used to 
characterize property, as it clearly assessed such unvested benefits under 
the second step, which focused on the property’s speculative nature.   
V.  FUTURE IMPLICATIONS OF THE MICKEY DECISION:  
IS BENDER STILL GOOD LAW? 
Mickey changed the equitable distribution landscape by expanding the 
test for determining whether an asset was subject to section 46b-81.  Not 
only did the majority opinion expressly indicate that Bender created a 
second decisional step, it arguably also added a third step of determining 
whether the asset constituted “fruits of the marriage.”  This nondescript 
language will undoubtedly open the door to more complicated litigation, as 
it could encompass most elements of a marital partnership.  Although the 
court narrowed this step’s application based on its holding in Mickey, so 
that future benefits which do not constitute deferred compensation and 
which vest after the finalization of the marital dissolution do not fall within 
the “fruits of the marriage” step, the potential creation of an additional 
requirement still serves as an elaboration of the already complex statutory 
definitions.  It could also further complicate the equitable distribution 
arena, which already has an extensive judicial history filled with somewhat 
haphazard decisions.199  
It is likely that the repercussions of this decision will be far-reaching.  
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Any asset that the parties own, whether individually or jointly, could be 
construed as “fruits of the marriage.”  In this context, “fruits” can be 
considered the result or the outcome of the marriage, which appears to 
create limitless opportunities for judicial discretion and expansive 
interpretations of the concept.  By only paring the breadth of the phrase’s 
expanse down through its limited application in Mickey, the court has 
further complicated the already clouded arena of equitable distribution.   
Many questions arise from this language, especially relating to its 
extension and analogy to other similar scenarios.  For instance, does 
Mickey also extend to worker’s compensation?  If so, does the court’s 
decision on this issue depend on whether the worker’s compensation 
served as deferred compensation during the marriage?  What about the role 
of time?  Is the opposing party barred from collecting any money if the 
compensated party is injured the day after the dissolution of marriage is 
finalized?  Should Mickey be construed so strictly or does such a narrow 
construction give rise to injustice?   
Considering the fact that worker’s compensation is, like disability, 
something that people try to avoid, should its receipt always be considered 
too speculative to constitute a marital asset subject to equitable 
distribution?  In this respect, is it possible to argue that Mickey turned on 
the fact that there were years between the injury and the divorce?  Does the 
injury become more likely and less of an expectancy based on the time 
between divorce and compensation, or does its sheer undesirability bar it 
from being defined in this way?  All of these questions remain 
unanswered.  While Mickey was intended to clarify this contentious part of 
the law, it seems to have instead created more questions than answers as to 
how it will be applied to future cases and how the arguably new third step 
will be addressed and utilized in upcoming disputes.   
On the other hand, it is also possible that “fruits of the marriage” could 
simply be interpreted as dicta that does not constitute the creation of an 
additional requirement.  Under this interpretation, in the future, the court 
should only utilize the two-step test asserted in Bender when making its 
determination of what constitutes property under section 46b-81.   
The “fruits of the marriage” language could also serve as support for 
the court’s notion that time is an integral element in determining whether 
property is distributable as a marital asset.200  Therefore, this language 
could memorialize the court’s finding that property obtained before the 
finalization of the dissolution of marriage in Mickey constituted marital 
property, while any assets obtained after this finalization were not.201  
Unfortunately, the purpose and role of this language are very much 
unknown, as the Mickey decision, and its impact, is still in its infancy.  It is 
                                                                                                                          
200 See supra notes 175–80 and accompanying text. 
201 Mickey, 974 A.2d at 652. 
 978 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:949 
going to take further litigation to determine whether the court intended for 
this language to constitute another standard for property or whether it is 
merely an extrapolation or interpretation of the already defined statutory 
limitations on equitable distribution.  
Although it is nearly impossible to predict the impact that this arguably 
peripheral language will have on future cases, based on precedent, it is 
likely that the “fruits of the marriage” phrase will become an additional 
step in the Bender test.  Prior to the Mickey decision, the court championed 
a broad notion of property, as evidenced by its intentionally expansive 
definition of the term in Krafick.202  Mickey, however, narrowed the realm 
of equitable distribution by finding that disability benefits were too 
speculative.203  The lower courts are likely to interpret this decision as the 
supreme court’s purposeful contraction of equitable distribution.  As such, 
they will probably be inclined to utilize the “fruits of the marriage” 
language as another requirement that would achieve this narrowing 
function, rather than to dismiss it as inconsequential dicta.        
In light of this somewhat flexible and ambiguous language, is there 
any room left to argue that Bender is no longer good law?  There seem to 
be three distinct ways to analyze the status of Bender post-Mickey: (1) 
completely overruled through the court’s later analysis; (2) still entirely 
relevant in light of its superficial gloss over and facial integration of the 
two-step test; or (3) reconcilable due to the Court’s implicit 
acknowledgement of a meaningful difference between unvested pension 
benefits and disability benefits.   
As to the first argument, Mickey appears to extend Bender to its 
breaking point.  This position would lament that, based on the existing test, 
Bender and Mickey should have both resulted in the same decision, and it 
would assert that the court’s failure to rule in the same fashion constituted 
a per se overruling of Bender.  In analyzing the facts in Mickey, both sides 
of the argument would presumably agree that Mickey did not comply with 
the first step of the Bender test.  The defendant’s disability benefits were 
not a presently existing, legally enforceable right at the time of the 
dissolution of marriage.  At the time of the dissolution proceeding, it would 
have been outrageous to award the plaintiff part of the defendant’s 
disability benefits, requiring him to pay for something that he himself had 
not yet received and may never receive.  In that respect, it is clear that the 
benefit was not legally enforceable at the time of the finalization of the 
parties’ divorce, as the defendant had no right to the proceeds until the 
unfortunate disabling event occurred, and it would be patently unfair to 
label it as such. 
It is the second step of the test that is highly contentious between the 
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two positions.  Those that assert that Mickey overruled Bender would note 
that the court should have treated Mickey the same way as it treated 
Bender, that both benefits were not too speculative to constitute marital 
property subject to distribution due to their undeniable similarities.  They 
would fail to draw a strong and defining distinction between the two 
benefits and the facts surrounding the cases, which would ultimately 
warrant the court’s making an opposite finding.  In terms of this side’s 
opinion of the “fruits of the marriage” language, it would probably assert 
that these words could constitute an entirely new test under section 46b-81, 
since Mickey itself serves to overrule the well-established equitable 
distribution law in Connecticut.   
As to the second argument, while one might correctly assert that the 
facts in Bender are extremely analogous to those in Mickey, the court 
makes a very slim distinction between the type of benefits at issue in 
Mickey and those in Bender.  There is, however, one important difference 
between how their applicability to section 46b-81 plays out in practice, 
which ultimately decided the cases.  The cases are distinct enough to 
warrant different holdings.  The fact that retirement pension benefits 
ultimately serve as deferred compensation, while disability benefits serve 
as future compensation,204 coupled with one’s likely effort to avoid the 
vesting of a disability benefit with the opposite being true for a retirement 
benefit, further increases the former’s speculative nature and decreases the 
latter’s.  In this respect, Mickey and Bender operate harmoniously under 
the same framework of a two-step test and assert the same premise that the 
level of expectancy and the asset’s function rules the world of inchoate 
property interests.  
Another way to understand the argument that Mickey did not overrule 
Bender is to consider what the result would have been if the decisions 
applied retroactively, or if Bender had been decided after Mickey.  The 
rationale for the court potentially asserting that the Bender retirement 
pension benefits were “too speculative” based on the Mickey rhetoric 
would look something like the following.  Although the court concluded in 
Mickey that individuals want to avoid an unfortunate accident which results 
in disability, it could just as easily be argued that someone would want to 
avoid losing their retirement benefits at all costs.  In this respect, one could 
assert that obtaining disability is too speculative because one acts in ways 
that encourage prevention, while one could similarly find that obtaining 
retirement benefits is a near certainty because the requirements to do so are 
fairly mechanical.  Disability, just like the failure to receive retirement 
benefits, requires the occurrence of an event that is outside of the course of 
one’s normal activities, thereby making it too speculative to constitute 
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property.   
Individuals who believe that Mickey followed the Bender precedent 
would probably define the “fruits of the marriage” language as mere dicta, 
maintaining that the two step test has remained untouched and unexpanded 
by the court’s finding in Mickey.  In their opinion, this language, if 
anything, would serve to narrow and define the two-step test so as not to 
create an expansive blanket of discretion for the courts.  It could also 
function as a temporal restraint, constraining one’s property interests to the 
time of marriage, which is not a novel limitation. 
As to the third argument, it is possible to find harmony among the 
seemingly contradictory decisions in Mickey and Bender by identifying a 
fundamental and meaningful difference between pension benefits and 
disability benefits, which would render the former foreseeable and 
divisible and the latter speculative and non-divisible.  From this 
perspective, the equitable distribution of marital assets is intended to 
furnish the spouses with their legitimate expectations arising from their 
partnership.  When parties begin to comingle their assets and plan for the 
future, they presumably intend to rely on the pension benefits as a means 
of financial stability during retirement, and the deferred compensation 
through pension benefits, as Krafick noted, become one of the parties’ 
most valuable assets.205  When parties envision their lives together, 
however, neither of their views of the future include compensation through 
disability benefits, presumably because a debilitating injury is both 
unforeseeable and undesirable.  If the ultimate goal of equitable 
distribution is to provide parties with their legitimate expectations of the 
marriage, dividing disability benefits is contrary to this objective because it 
furnishes the uninjured party with compensation that he or she did not rely 
on, expect, or foresee.  Parties expect to utilize pension benefits in the 
future because they are valuable assets that result from deferred 
compensation, money which could have provided a more stable lifestyle 
over the years, but was purposefully set aside for retirement.  Parties do not 
expect to receive disability benefits, however, because they are not the type 
of interest that has been earned in the same way that pension benefits have, 
and they are not the result of the same long-term sacrifice.  As such, 
pension benefits and disability benefits should be treated differently during 
the equitable distribution process.  While the majority in Mickey 
acknowledges the inherent difference between pension and disability 
benefits by describing disability as an unfortunate accident that people try 
to avoid,206 it does not articulate the effect of this distinction on the 
ultimate holding of the case.  One way to interpret the seemingly contrary 
decisions in Mickey and Bender, however, is to find that equitably 
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distributable property should be determined by the parties’ legitimate 
expectations of their marital partnership.  
Despite the three aforementioned rationales, there remains some 
difficulty in reconciling the Bender and Mickey decisions, a direct result of 
Justice Zarella’s potential underlying agenda.  As the author of the dissent 
in Bender, it was clear that he believed that unvested pension benefits 
should have been considered too speculative because there was no 
guarantee that the benefit holder would ever receive them.207  One could 
argue that Mickey was decided as it was because Justice Zarella merely 
wanted to overrule what he believed was the court’s misstep in Bender.  In 
this respect, despite the fact that he articulates one, Justice Zarella does not 
seem to believe that there is any material difference between pension 
benefits and disability benefits that would ultimately warrant treating them 
differently under the law.  It is undeniable that Justice Zarella supports the 
Bender two-step test.  It is also evident, however, despite his brief 
discussion of the differences between pension benefits and disability 
benefits, that he believes that all unvested benefits should be treated as too 
speculative to divide, regardless of the parties’ expectations or the purpose 
that the benefits ultimately serve.   
Therefore, I believe that the second argument is the most accurate 
conceptualization of Mickey’s relationship to Bender.  Mickey seems to 
dismantle Bender’s precedent without outwardly overruling Bender, 
thereby serving as a de facto overruling, masked by flowery language.  
Nonetheless, this somewhat simplistic interpretation of Mickey’s position 
in relation to Bender does not seem to fully account for the complexities of 
the benefits at issue.  One cannot deny that there are unique attributes to 
disability and pension benefits that disallow them from being interpreted 
synonymously.  Therefore, an interpretation that treats them as 
interchangeable entities would be presumptively inaccurate.   
Similarly, without context, the third argument, which carved out a 
meaningful difference between unvested pension benefits and disability 
benefits, seems completely palatable.  Justice Zarella’s position, however, 
as the author of both the majority opinion in Mickey and the dissenting 
opinion in Bender makes this interpretation unlikely.  Justice Zarella’s 
dissent seems to advocate for an equitable distribution scheme in which 
unvested benefits are universally interpreted as too contingent to constitute 
property subject to distribution.208  Although a meaningful difference can 
certainly be extracted from the two categories of benefits, this was 
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arguably not Justice Zarella’s intent.  The inherent ideological conflict 
between Justice Zarella’s opinions in Bender and Mickey is too obvious to 
ignore and too intentional to deny.   
As such, the second argument is the most likely interpretation of the 
court’s purpose in Mickey.  Justice Zarella had the opportunity to revert 
back to the regime that he had unsuccessfully advocated for in the Bender 
dissent, and he took it.  Rather than couching Mickey in terms of its 
complete evisceration of Bender, Justice Zarella eloquently formulated a 
passable distinction between the purposes of the two categories of benefits 
that permitted other justices to agree with his analysis and holding.  Under 
this interpretation of Mickey, the “fruits of the marriage” language should 
be interpreted as dicta rather than the addition of a third prong to the 
Bender test because Justice Zarella’s opinion preserved the Bender two-
prong test as good law and the governing standard for equitable 
distribution of property during a marital dissolution.  In this respect, the 
Mickey opinion only changed the application of that test.  Whether or not 
the relationship between the two cases proves relevant in the future, 
however, remains to be seen.   
Regardless of one’s interpretation of Mickey’s effect on Bender, what 
is most important is that the court’s jurisprudence continues to evolve at a 
fairly commendable speed.  Embracing this growth, the court noted that the 
Bender decision “expanded [the] notion of property under § 46b-81[] [to] 
recogniz[e that] that there is a spectrum of interests that do not fit 
comfortably into our traditional scheme and yet should be available in 
equity for courts to distribute.”209  In this respect, until Bender, the court 
was operating under a set of rules that had not upgraded with the 
advancements of the world, particularly concerning the inclusion of fringe 
benefits in employment contracts.  Property no longer could be described 
solely in terms of material belongings, as the traditional regime had 
operated; technological advances created the option of liquid assets in the 
form of benefits programs and stock options.  As usual, the law operated 
well behind the changing times until Bender.  As such, Bender served to 
revolutionize and update the world of equitable distribution by accounting 
for the new property interests, many of which are inchoate, while Mickey 
was able to narrow this scope so as to begin to define the realm of mere 
expectancy that was too speculative to constitute equitably distributable 
property. 
VI.  CONCLUSION: WHERE DO WE STAND TODAY? 
All that is clear for now is that Mickey is the governing law in 
Connecticut.  As such, it seems safe to assert that the Bender two-step test 
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is alive and well.  Therefore, when determining if assets are subject to 
equitable distribution under section 46b-81, an attorney must first analyze 
the traditional notions of property, and decide whether the asset constitutes 
a presently existing and legally enforceable right.  If the asset does not 
seem to fit comfortably within this definition due to its inchoate nature, he 
must then determine whether the property constitutes a contingent, un-
matured interest that is not too speculative.   
Based on the court’s previous holdings, it is clear that if the asset 
serves as deferred compensation, it will typically be considered property 
because it would have served as additional compensation during the 
marriage to increase the parties’ quality of life if the benefit system was 
not in place.  Further, benefits like those for disability, which an individual 
strives to avoid, could be deemed too speculative to constitute marital 
property subject to distribution because of this desire for prevention.  The 
final factor that the court seems to elucidate is the importance of time.  If 
the vesting event is a “fruit of the marriage” and occurred during the 
marriage, it will probably constitute equitably distributable property, while 
events that occurred after the finalization of the dissolution of marriage 
will not.  It must be noted, however, that the court never proposes the 
“fruits of the marriage” language as an additional requirement for the 
Bender two-step test nor does it assert that this language serves as an 
expansion or narrowing of the current law under Bender.  Therefore, the 
purpose and application of this ambiguous language will remain a mystery 
until its limits are tested in the judicial arena.  For now, the governing 
stance in Connecticut is that the Mickey decision did nothing more than 
supplement the well-established Bender two-step test framework.   
 
